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BOOK REVIEWS
"GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND
CHOICE": CONSTITUTIONAL ESSAYS ON WAR,
FOREIGN RELATIONS, AND FEDERALISM. By
Charles A. Lofgren.I New York, N.Y. and Oxford: Oxford
University Press. 1986. Pp. xviii, 235. $24.95.
Eugene V. Rostow2

Professor Charles Lofgren is one of the best contemporary students of American constitutional history, and especially of the respective powers of the president and Congress in the field of foreign
affairs. His new book, which draws its title from Hamilton in the
first Federalist paper, includes six of his major articles on these
themes published during the last twenty years. It is important to
have the articles conveniently available. They belong on the short
shelf of thoughtful and disciplined scholarly work in a field notable
for passion, polemics, and extravagant disregard of the evidence.
Lofgren's craftsmanship is meticulous, but his outlook has two
blind spots. The first is jurisprudential: he exaggerates the role of
"original intent" in the growth of law, the subject of at least four of
his chapters. The second is a defect of formation: he seems to have
little familiarity with international law, a weakness which particularly affects Chapter 5, his well-known essay on United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation.3
This review will focus mainly on these two aspects of Lofgren's
work.
I

As an expositor of "original intent," Lofgren is not an unsophisticated Luddite, professing the kind of fundamentalism so
characteristic of Justice Black in his moments of transcendent conI. Roy P. Crocker Professor of American Politics and History, Claremont McKenna
College and Graduate Faculty in History, Claremont Colleges.
2. Sterling Professor of Law Emeritus, Yale Law School, and Distinguished Visiting
Research Professor of Law and Diplomacy, National Defense University.
3. 299 u.s. 304 (1936).
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stitutional piety. On the contrary, his credo, stated in Chapter 3, is
in itself unexceptionable:
As Justice Holmes reminded us, "when we are dealing with words that are also a
constituent act ... we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen by the most gifted of its begetters."
"Our whole experience," he cautioned, needs consideration and "not merely" what
was said during the founding period. Still, Holmes's choice of the phrase "not
merely" is worth pondering. It suggests that one should at least take account of
accurate history in fashioning constitutional arguments, even if that history is not
fully dispositive of the issues in question.

Thus Lofgren's formal conception of his task as historian is a
limited one: to provide the lawyer and legal scholar with an "accurate" version of the lawmakers' "original understanding" of what
they were doing. But "the original understanding" of the lawmaker
in Lofgren's sense of the term can never be revealed only or even
mainly by a review of "what was said during the founding period."
What was done or taken for granted as super- obvious, then or immediately thereafter, is often quite as significant as the words one or
another of the diarists may have written. Nor can "the original understanding" conjured up by Lofgren's method ever be "fully dispositive" of an issue in controversy, to emphasize his revealing
phrase. It is at most one strand and not necessarily the most important strand in the endless process through which a society's ideal of
justice responds to its customs and mores to produce its living law.
Lofgren's conception of law is far too static. How, for example,
would it apply to the electoral college? The "original understanding" of the Founding Fathers is reasonably clear. Have we been
electing presidents unconstitutionally since 1788?
Even if one should concede, as I cannot, that the historian's
task is in some sense different from that of the lawyer and legal
scholar, Lofgren casts too narrow a net. His attention is directed
almost exclusively to the records of the Constitutional Convention,
The Federalist Papers and other documents of the controversy over
the ratification of the Constitution, and some other early commentaries. But reading the Constitution, like reading any other law, or
indeed like any other reading, requires a wider view. Words come
to us with the baggage of life.
The Founding Fathers thought their Constitution should speak
for itself. They did not publish their austere official journal and
frowned on the publication of private records. The official journal
was not published until 1819, and Madison's Notes were issued in
1840. Madison's Notes and the other direct and indirect evidence of
what was said during the debates are fragmentary at best, and often
misleading. The documentation of the debates in the state ratifying
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conventions is even less satisfactory. 4
In general, there is the perennial and insoluble problem of how
the "intentions" of the thirty-eight men who signed the Constitution and the several hundred who voted for ratification in the state
conventions could be inferred from the reported language of the few
who spoke or wrote on each issue, even if verbatim transcripts of
their words existed. The Federalist Papers, magnificent as they are
as an exposition of political philosophy, were exercises in advocacy.
They were written in large part to allay the fears of those who saw
the Constitution as an engine of tyranny, the source of an oppressive national government. It is hardly surprising that The Federalist
Papers did not fully prepare public opinion for the robust national
institutions which developed as the Constitution was tested and applied in the crucible of experience.
These and cognate problems in discerning "the original understanding" of any particular part of the Constitution, or of the
Constitution as a whole, are secondary, however. To interpret the
Constitution in its full context requires much more than conscientiously poring over the documentary record, such as it is. In itself
archival research would be misleading and inadequate even if the
records were rich and complete.
First of all, it is intellectually impossible for people of the twentieth century to discover "the original intent" of their eighteenth
century forefathers in any detail. American civilization in the late
twentieth century is visibly derived from that of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, and tightly linked to it. During the last two
centuries, however, there have been many changes in the intellectual and moral universe of American life, some of fundamental importance: in attitudes toward religion, for example, race, the
treatment of women, poverty, and many other subjects. The role of
the United States in world politics has been transformed by its own
growth and other changes in the world balance of power. As a result, the problem of American national security is completely different from that which confronted the United States government
between 1789 and the years immediately before the First World
War, and the inherent friction between the president and Congress
has been correspondingly intensified. The landscape of American
life is different; the relationship of ideas and problems to each other
4. See Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary
Record, 65 TEX. L. REv. I (1986). Mr. Hutson writes: "The purpose of this Article is to
issue a caveat about Convention records, to warn that there are problems with most of them
and that some have been compromised-perhaps fatally-by the editorial interventions of
hirelings and partisans. To recover original intent from these records may be an impossible
hermeneutic assignment." /d. at 2.
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is different. Moreover, the modern scholar inevitably approaches
the historical record with the preoccupations of his own period in
mind, whereas those of his ancestors usually turn out to have been
quite different. No one can successfully put himself in the shoes of
Madison or Hamilton, Jefferson or Washington. And even if a
scholar of super-human imagination succeeded in doing so, the result might well be disappointing. As Lofgren notes, "Madison and
Hamilton, who presumably knew something about the original intent, came to contradictory conclusions" about the respective powers of the president and Congress in the field of war and foreign
relations within four years of the ratification. The twentieth century scholar can hardly hope to achieve a better footing.
What survives of the Constitution, and retains its full vitality,
is not "the original understanding" of the Founding Fathers about
this or that detail, but its constitutional character and its constitutional purpose: its basic structure, on the one hand, and its animating policies, on the other, what Montesquieu called "the spirit of the
laws," their shaping aspirations. Marshall's famous sentence-"We
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding"s-is
the most important sentence he ever wrote. It sums up a jurisprudence of the utmost subtlety and sophistication which, so far as I
know, has never been examined in philosophical terms. Marshall's
thesis is that a constitution should not be a "prolix code" but a
short, simple, general document which citizens can understand as
the guaranty of their rights for ages to come. It is an "outline,"
Marshall said, and is not intended to anticipate and settle every
question but necessarily leaves much to the discretion of future governments. The American Constitution, he made clear, should be
construed as a whole, not bit by bit, and construed moreover in its
full matrix of cultural history. Its construction should have continuity as well as flexibility. The Constitution should be faithful to
its broad principles and purposes yet capable of adaptation to the
changing circumstances of the American experience.
Marshall's greatest opinions illustrate the distinction between
purposes and values, on the one hand, and detail on the other. He
almost never starts with the language of a particular clause of the
Constitution. His major premise is drawn from something Marshall
calls "the Grand Design" or "the fundamental principles" of "the
American polity." After he has formulated and discussed those
principles, and applied them to the case before him, he drily comments that no language in the Constitution precludes the Court's
5.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
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conclusion or its reasoning.6
What were the broad purposes on which the Marshallian Constitution rests? Among those he emphasized in particular cases
were establishing a government of laws and not of men; balancing
the authority of the one and the many, the nation and the states;
and giving the new national institutions ample elbow room to carry
out their essential functions, while holding them to high standards
of democratic responsibility. We can be confident, for example,
that the Founding Fathers thought that the absence of an executive
was one of the great weaknesses of the American government under
the Articles of Confederation, and that they sought to establish a
strong, energetic president as an independent branch of government, a president who was definitely not a prime minister, but
would be democratically accountable in appropriate cases to
the people, to Congress, or to the courts. Even this highly generalized sentence probes the limits of "the original understanding."
Madison, one of the most active and important participants in the
Constitutional Convention, resisted the idea that the secretary of
state could be summoned before a courtJ And as Lofgren concedes, we cannot be sure that the signers of the Constitution
thought they were requiring a congressional vote before the president could order the armed forces to do anything more than repel a
sudden attack on the United States itself.s
II

Lofgren's weakness in international law appears most conspicuously in Chapter 5. In attempting to evaluate Justice Sutherland's
opinion in Curtiss- Wright, he assembles twenty pages of material
drawn from Farrand, the reports of the state ratifying conventions,
the controversy over Jay's Treaty of 1794, and other contemporary
sources in order to clarify what kind of sovereignty the Founding
Fathers thought the government of the United States possessed
before and after 1776, and whether that sovereignty was derived
from the British Crown, the people of the United States, or the Con6. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I, 17 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,405 (1819); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
7. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 166.
8. Lofgren writes: "Evidence from the years immediately following ratification of the
Constitution thus corroborates the conclusion that Americans originally understood Congress to have at least a coordinate, and probably the dominant role in initiating all but the
most obviously defensive wars, whether declared or not." Later, however, he declares:
"Both sides in the Korean debate conceded that the President could act, without Congress, to
counter an immediate, dangerous threat to American interests and security." Professor Lofgren comments on these two passages in his introduction. See generally Rostow, Once More
Unto the Breach, 21 VAL. U.L. REV. I (1986).
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stitution. The international law view is the one element of the problem not mentioned in Lofgren's painstaking array of what a number
of people said on the subject at the time. But the international law
dimension of the problem is decisive.
States are born and come into being by international agreement
or by war. Statehood is a question of "fact," the international lawyers say. States have territories, governments, armies, police forces,
postal services, and the other accoutrements of statehood. Diplomatic recognition is the political and legal mechanism through
which the international community or a considerable number of its
leading members acknowledges that a state exists and is endowed
with "sovereignty" for purposes of international law.
The Constitution does not purport to confer sovereignty on the
United States. On the contrary, from the first words of the preamble to the end, it treats the United States as an ongoing (and sovereign) political entity, whose government was being replaced by the
new successor government provided for in the Constitution of 1787,
a government created by the sovereign people of the United States,
not by the states, and one which acknowledged the debts of the two
previous American governments and the treaties they had made.
The United States of America became a sovereign state when it was
generally recognized as such during and after the Revolutionary
War, first by France and then by other European states. Because
we (and France) won the Revolutionary War, sovereignty is deemed
to have vested at least by the time the Continental Congress, which
was already conducting a war, declared the independence of the
United States in 1776. The Confederacy, by contrast, is considered
never to have existed, at least in American constitutional law.
The Americans were intimately familiar with the significance
of recognition in international law. One has only to glance at the
instructions of our diplomatic missions during the Revolution to
realize that obtaining diplomatic recognition in Europe was a central and urgent goal of United States foreign policy at the time.
The Constitution thus recognizes that by reason of its establishment and recognition, the United States possesses all the powers
other states possess under international law. It divides those powers between the president and Congress, Congress being granted the
legislative authority and the president, the executive. All that Curtiss- Wright says and decides is that Congress may "delegate" some
of its discretion in "the broad external realm" to the president, and
that the constitutional standards governing congressional delegations of power to the president in the area of foreign affairs may be
different from those thought to prevail in other areas, in view of the
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president's independent power as the nation's representative
abroad.
Lofgren claims to have demolished the legitimacy of CurtissWright. He did not succeed.
In Chapter 1, Lofgren's influential paper, War-Making Under
the Constitution: The Original Understanding, he briefly reviews the
international law treatises and practice of the times, and recognizes
that "declared" or "unlimited" and "undeclared," "limited," or
"imperfect" wars were familiar categories of international law, as
common in the usage and doctrine of the period as they are now.
He then confronts the question of what article I, section 8 of the
Constitution meant when it conferred on Congress only the power
to "declare" war.
Hamilton's Pacificus papers, to which Lofgren briefly refers,
would treat Congress's power to declare war as an exception to the
general power of the nation under international law to undertake
hostilities in times of peace or of war. Hamilton characterizes this
national power as executive in character, and contends that the
power to declare war, as an exception to a more general power,
should be confined to its express terms-i.e., that the president was
given the constitutional power to initiate all forms of war known to
international law except fully declared, notorious, and unlimited
war. Congress has the last word on the subject, but the president
can act first, as many presidents have acted since Washington's first
term.
Lofgren dismisses Hamilton's view in uncharacteristically
summary terms. It seems "improbable," he says, that a contemporary would have accepted the view that the power to initiate undeclared war was "lodged with the executive." Since Hamilton was
a knowledgeable contemporary, and wrote the Pacificus papers, it is
hard to see the basis for Lofgren's conclusion. At the time and
since, Hamilton's Pacificus papers have been considered far more
persuasive than Madison's half-hearted attempt to answer them.
Corwin, the outstanding modern scholar on the subject, accepted
Hamilton's opinion, not Madison's. Corwin's treatment of the issues is not discussed or even cited by Lofgren.9 Moreover, Washington followed Hamilton's advice, and so did every president
thereafter, with Congress's support or acquiescence.
Lofgren attempts to reinforce his conclusion by a strained interpretation of international law usage with regard to letters of marque and reprisal. He suggests that Congress's authority to issue
9. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS (1917).

(4th ed. 1957); E.
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letters of marque and reprisal under article I, section 8 is in all
probability a grant of exclusive authority to authorize all forms of
warfare not conducted pursuant to a declaration of war. This is a
far-fetched argument, as Lofgren tacitly acknowledges by calling
for "a more detailed consideration" of the subject. The practice of
issuing letters of marque and reprisal was ended by treaty in the
middle of the nineteenth century.

III
Professor Lofgren's studies are and will remain useful resources for lawyers and legal scholars, but their utility is limited by
the narrowness of their historiographical and jurisprudential foundation, and by the fact that even Lofgren is occasionally tempted to
go beyond the evidence. In the heat of battle on the significance of
the fact that the Constitution grants Congress the power to "declare" war, for example, his reasoning approaches the level of wishful thinking.
But the basic trouble with Lofgren's method is its preoccupation with what was said, and especially with what was said during
the early years under the Constitution, rather than with what was
done. The living constitution, the constitution with a small "c," is
(like all law) the pattern of behavior the society deems right, in this
case the pattern of governmental behavior viewed through the
prism of our constitutional values and our constitutional history.
The interaction of custom, necessity, and the prescribed law sometimes produces interesting results. Thus Jefferson, confronted with
the Louisiana Purchase, concluded that the United States, like
every other state, could acquire territory by treaty, and would not
have to pass a constitutional amendment, as he had previously
thought would be required. And the most important and constructive achievement of Nixon's presidency was his secret warning to
the Soviet Union not to bomb the Chinese nuclear plants, a warning
which in the nature of things would have been ineffective if it had
been made public at the time, authorized by statute, or even revealed to congressional leaders through the mysterious process
called "consultation." The "original understanding" was that the
president should be capable of "energy, secrecy, and dispatch," as
Hamilton put it. That constitutional goal necessarily prevails over
the language that the Founding Fathers may have used at the time.

